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Informant Credibility and Evidence of
Cooperation in Other Cases
Clifford S. Fishmant
Abstract
Professor CliffordFishman here addresses many ofthe issues that arise
when an informant is used as a witness at trial
Introduction
The prosecutor calls an informant as a witness. Her carefully prepared
questions elicit in damning detail how-according to the informant-the
defendant eagerly participated in the crimes charged in the indictment.
On cross, defense counsel goes into full attack mode, covering the
informant's prior convictions, his other unsavory and untruthful acts, and
the informant's sordid reasons for cooperating with the police-money,
a break on his own case, or both.'
To rehabilitate the informant, the prosecutor wants to elicit testimony
from police officers about the many cases the informant has helped them
make and how truthful he has always been in the process. To what extent
t B.A. (1966), University of Rochester; J.D. (1969), Columbia Law School. The
author is Professor of Law, The Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America. Professor Fishman acknowledges with gratitude the assistance of Angela
Pegram, J.D. The Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America, 2002,
for her assistance in preparing this Article.
From 1969 to 1977 Professor Fishman served as an Assistant District Attorney in
New York County District Attorney's Office and as Chief Investigating Assistant D.A.
in New York City's Special Narcotics Prosecutor's Office where, among other things,
he tried dozens ofjury trials; wrote and supervised the execution of more than thirty
wiretap and eavesdrop orders; wrote search warrants leading to the seizure of untold
quantities of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana as well as a two hundred pound bog of peat
moss; oversaw the purchase of the most expensive pound of pancake mix in law
enforcement history; and acquired extensive experience in the care and feeding of
informants.
'Often a prosecutor will elicit much of this negative material on direct examination,
in the hopes of reducing its sting somewhat and of enabling her to tell the jury during
final argument that she was "open and frank" with them and "did not attempt to hide"
the informant's less than pristine past. (It costs nothing to be "open and frank" about
information the other side has an absolute right to bring out anyway.) Even so, defense
counsel undoubtedly will cover the same information, in greater detail and with
maximum sarcasm and indignation.
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
should she be allowed to do so? And once she does, what can defense
counsel do in response?
This situation arises frequently in criminal trials, although surprisingly,
not all that often in reported opinions. This Article discusses the law and
tactics of the situation.
I. "Character Evidence"
It is axiomatic that a party may not bolster the credibility of a witness
unless and until that credibility has been attacked.2 The advisory com-
mittee's note3 to Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a) explains why: "The
2 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 608(a)( 2 ) (relating to reputation and opinion testimony);
FED. R. EVID. 608(b)(2) (relating to evidence of specific acts); see also United States
v. Bolick, 917 F.2d 135,138-39 (4th Cir. 1990); Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d 767,
772 (8th Cir. 1960); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 47 (John
W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (stating that, "absent an attack upon credibility, no bolster-
ing evidence is allowed"); 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARETA. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 608.11, at 17 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2002) (stating
that "[r]eputation or opinion evidence may not be used to bolster a witness's character
for truthfiness until his or her veracity has first been attacked"); GLEN WEISSENBERGER,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTH-
ORITY § 608.5 (1999); 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1104 (Chadboum rev. 1972).
The Uniform Rules of Evidence contain an identical provision to the Federal Rules
of Evidence. In addition, thirty-three states have codified identical or similar versions
of the federal rules. 2 BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 9.22 (15th ed. 2001); see ALA. R. EvID. 608; ALASKA R. EVID.
608; ARIz. R. EVID. 608; ARK. R. EviD. 608; COLO. R. EvID. 608; DEL. R. EvID. 608;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.609 (1999); HAW. R. EVID. 608; IDAHO R. EVID. 608; IOWA R.
EViD. 608; ME. R. EVID. 608; MICH. R. EVID. 608; MINN. R. EVID. 608; MISS. R. EVID.
608; MONT. R. EVID. 608; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-608 (1995); N.H. R. EViD. 608; N.M.
R. EVID. 608; N.C.R. EVID. 608; N.D. R. EvID. 608; OHIoR. EVED. 608; 12 OKLA. STAT.
§ 2608 (1993); OR. R. EVID. 608; R.I. R. EVD. 608; S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 19-14-9
(1995); TENN. R. EVID. 608; TEx. R. EVID. 608; UTAH R. EVID. 608; VT. R. EVID. 608;
WASH. R. EVID. 608; W. VA. R. EVID. 608; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 906.08 (2000); WYO.
R. EVID. 608. But see CAL. EVID. CODE § 786 (1995) (stating only evidence regarding
an individual's character for truth or veracity is permitted to attack or support a witness's
credibility); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.085 (2000) (permitting opinion testimony in limited
circumstances, prohibiting reputation evidence, and forbidding use ofextrinsic evidence
to provide prior acts, except when prior act involves the commission of a crime).
' The Advisory Committee is a body of practitioners, judges, and scholars that was
created by the Supreme Court's Judicial Conference. I CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE Crm 3d § 4 (1999). This body advises the Judicial
Conference as to which rules need to be written, amended, or put into force. Id. The




enormous needless consumption of time which a contrary practice would
entail justifies the limitation."4
It is likewise axiomatic that the character of a witness for truthfulness
may not be attacked by extrinsic evidence of the witness's prior untruthful
acts, nor defended by evidence of his prior truthful acts.5 First, evidence
as to whether someone lied, or told the truth on other occasions, does not
compel the conclusion that he is lying or testifying truthfully now, and
is therefore of uncertain relevance.6 Second, if a party adversely affected
4 FED. R. EviD. 608(a) advisory committee's note; see also United States v. Riddle,
193 F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that Rule 608(b)'s prohibition on using
extrinsic evidence is to avoid holding mini-trials); United States v. Elliott, 89 F.3d 1360,
1368 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that the prohibition in Rule 608(b) is to avoid mini-trials
and any such evidence admitted is at the discretion of the court); MCCORMICK, supra
note 2, § 47, at 72 (stating that a "witness's proponent ordinarily may not bolster the
witness's credibility [because] we do not want to devote court time to the witness's
credibility and run the risk of distracting the jury from the historical merits unless and
until the opposing attorney attacks the witness's credibility"); WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 2, § 608.20[ 1], at 33 ("Instances of conduct that are offered solely on the
issue ofa witness's credibility are frequently characterized as 'collateral' matters, since
they do not address elements of any cause of action or defense . . . [and] extrinsic
evidence is inadmissible to prove collateral matters."); WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1104,
at 233 (stating that "there is no reason why time should be spent in proving that which
may be assumed to exist"). But see Bufford v. Rowan Cos., 994 F.2d 155, 159-60 (5th
Cir. 1993) (stating that Rule 608(b) does not prohibit the use of extrinsic evidence to
"contradict a witness's testimony about a material issue in the case").
'See, e.g., FED. R. EViD. 608(b); see also 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER
B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 308 (1979) (stating that "truthfulness may be
established by reputation or opinion testimony, and by cross-examination concerning
specific conduct of the witness, but not by extrinsic evidence of such specific conduct").
Although it is accepted that collateral matters may not be proven by extrinsic
evidence, one commentator explains:
It has been urged that the discretionary approach of Rule 403 should be
substituted.... Although Rule 608(b) expressly prohibits extrinsic evidence of a
witness's untruthful acts, the Federal Rules do not expressly codify a categorical
collateral fact restriction.... [U]nder Rule 403, the judge would make a practical
judgment as to whether the importance of the witness's testimony and the
impeachment warrant the expenditure of the additional trial time.
MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 49.
6 MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 40 (stating that "[t]he empirical studies of
untruthfulness indicate that a person's general character trait for truthfulness is a poor
predictor of whether she is untruthful on a specific occasion"); see also WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.2011].
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by a witness's (Wl's) testimony is permitted to offer evidence of an
unrelated instance in which WI lied or acted deceitfully, the party relying
on that witness should be permitted to offer evidence that W 1 did not do
as alleged, or to offer evidence of occasions on which WI told the truth.7
Thus, admitting extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior untruthful acts
could give rise to a series of mini-trials.'
A frequently cited application of the first axiom is the rule that the
government may not offer evidence about the past reliability of an inform-
ant-witness in other cases to suggest to the jury that his testimony ought
to be believed in the current case. The question arises whether a defen-
dant's attempts to impeach the informer opens the door to such evidence.
The issue is a subcategory of "character evidence." The proper answer
to the question should be: sometimes, and then only to a limited extent.
The term "character evidence" is used in the law to describe evidence
that does not relate directly to the specific facts at issue in the trial.9
Rather, its relevance depends primarily on the character or propensity of
an individual toward certain behavior:o ifX"characteristically" behaves
7 MCCORMiCK, supra note 2, § 47. But see WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2,
§ 608.12, at 20 (stating that "what constitutes an 'attack' on the witness's character for
truthfulness [can] become[] murky").
'Riddle, 193 F.3d at 998 (stating that the prohibition against the use of extrinsic
evidence is to avoid mini-trials); Elliott, 89 F.3d at 1368 (same).
9 3 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 14:1 (7th ed. 1998) (stating that
"character evidence is offered as a basis upon which to infer how a person behaved on
a particular occasion in the past"); 2 WEINSTEIN &BERGER, supra note 2, § 404.0211]-
[2], at 8 (defining character evidence and stating that "character evidence is not admis-
sible to prove conduct except as provided by Rule 404"); see also MCCORMICK, supra
note 2, §§ 45, 49 (discussing collateral issues and how the courts determine whether a
topic is collateral); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.02[2], at 9-10 (discussing
problems with character evidence), § 608.20[1], at 33 (describing character evidence
as collateral evidence).
Federal Rule of Evidence 404 permits character evidence to be used when: (1) the
character of the accused is a pertinent trait; (2) the character of the alleged victim is
important in the case; (3) the character of the witness is limited to evidence under rules
607, 608, and 609; (4) the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or act is not admitted to
show conformity the act. FED. R. EvD. 404.
'
0 FISHMAN, supra note 9, § 14:4, at 5; MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 186, 188; 2
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 404.1011], at 11 ("[A]lthough... evidence may
be relevant under Rule 401, its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.");
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.20[1]; WEISSENBERGER, supra note 2, §
404.3, § 404.4, § 608.1 ("[C]haracter evidence has a tendency to arouse the emotions
[Vol. 26:363
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a certain way, the argument goes, this is relevant to suggest that he
behaved the same way on the occasion in question.
Character evidence comes in two forms: general and specific."1
General character evidence is testimony regarding either the reputation
of a person or the witness's opinion of that person.' 2 Specific character
evidence relates to how a person behaved on one or more particular
occasions.13 The law governing character evidence consists of two dif-
ferent sets of rules. One set of rules governs admissibility of character
evidence about someone who has participated in some way in the events
at issue in the trial.'4 The second group of rules governs admissibility of
character evidence about someone who is testifying or has testified at the
trial.' 5 When (as often happens) a participant in the events testifies, both
sets of rules apply, which of course adds to the general confusion.'
6
A. Character of a Participant in the Events
As a general rule, character evidence about a participant in the events
in question-for example, the defendant, complainant, or alleged victim
in a criminal case, or the plaintiff or defendant in civil litigation-is not
admissible. 7 Despite its relevance, evidence as to how people behaved
and prejudices of the trier of fact, and the use of character evidence is consequently
attended by a substantial risk of a distortion of the accuracy of the fact-finding process."),
& § 608.2.
"FED. R. EviD. 404-405.
'2FED. R. EvID. 405(a). For an examination of corresponding state provisions, see
FISHMAN, supra note 9, § 16:6.
,a FED. R. EviD. 404(b), 405(b).
14 See, e.g., FED. R. EVD. 404,405,412-415. Uniform Rules of Evidence 404-405
are identical to the Federal Rules, and Uniform Rule of Evidence 412 is a modified
version of Federal Rule 412. For an examination of corresponding state provisions, see
FISHMAN, supra note 9, § 16:6 (Rules 404-405), § 19:6 (Rule 412); 4 CLIFFORD S.
FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 20:9 (Rule 413) & § 20:13 (Rule 414) (7th ed. 2000);
1 GREGORY P. JOSEPH ET AL., EVIDENCE IN AMERICA ch. 42 (1987).
15 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 608, 609. Although Uniform Rule of Evidence 608 is
identical to the Federal Rule of Evidence, Uniform Rule of Evidence 609 is a modified
version. JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 14.
16 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 404.02[2], at 8.
7 FISHMAN, supra note 9, § 16:1; MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 188; 2 WEINSTEIN
& BERGER, supra note 2, § 404.02[2], at 8. Thus, for example, as to general character
20021
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on other, unrelated occasions is excluded because it would distract the
jury from what should be its primary focus (i.e., the events that gave rise
to the lawsuit), and would greatly prolong trials and make the experience
even less pleasant than it already is for everyone involved in a trial (other
than the lawyers).18 These rules, and the complex structure of exceptions
to them, 9 have developed into a body of law so complex that judicial
evidence, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) provides, in part: "Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion...." FED. R. EvID. 404(a). Uniform Rule
of Evidence 404(a) contains identical language.
As to specific character evidence, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides, in part:
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." FED. R. EViD. 404(b). Uni-
form Rule of Evidence 404(b) contains identical language.
Similarly, Rule 412(a)(1) excludes evidence about a sex-offense complainant's "other
sexual behavior"; Rule 412(a)(2) excludes evidence of the complainant's "sexual
predisposition." FED. R. EviD. 412. Every state has a similar rule, which is known as
a "rape shield law." See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002); GA.
CODEANN. § 24-2-3 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (West 1996); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 48.069 (Michie 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1 (West 1994); TEX. R.
EVID. 412. These rules shield a rape complainant from having her previous sexual
activity exposed at trial. For an exhaustive analysis of rape shield laws, their exceptions,
and the litigation they have spawned, see FISHMAN, supra note 9, ch. 19; Clifford S.
Fishman, Consent, Credibility and the Constitution: Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense
Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44 CATH. U.L. REV. 709 (1995).
Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 are dramatic exceptions to the law's general
dislike of character evidence. These rules direct that a sex-offense defendant's prior
sexual offenses are generally admissible. See FED. R. EvID. 413-415. For an analysis
of this provision, which has received a mixed and generally negative reaction in the
states, see 4 FISHMAN, supra note 9, ch. 20.
'
8 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.02[2], at 9; see also FISHMAN, supra
note 9.
'9 Thus, Rules 404(a) and 405(a) permit a defendant to offer reputation or opinion
evidence of a pertinent trait of the defendant's character or of an alleged victim's
character; if the defendant does so, the prosecutor may respond in kind. See FISHMAN,
supra note 9, ch. 16; MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 190; 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 2, § 404.11 [2][b]. Rule 404(b) permits evidence of a person's specific "other acts"
where such acts have relevance independent of the forbidden propensity inference.
FISHMAN, supra note 9, ch. 17; 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, §§ 404.02,
404.12[3]. Rule 405(b) permits litigants to offer reputation, opinion, and specific act
evidence in those rare instances when a person's character is an "essential element" of
a cause of action or defense (e.g., negligent entrustment actions, child custody disputes,
and some defamation cases). FED. R. EVID. 405(b); see also United States v. Sonntag,
684 F.2d 781, 787-88 (11 th Cir. 1982) (holding that evidence of the defendant's sale
of barbiturate pills, marijuana, and cocaine was admissible to prove the defendant's
predisposition after he raised an entrapment defense); FISHMAN, supra note 9, ch. 15;
[Vol. 26:363
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decisions and scholarly literature written about them have probably
contributed substantially to both deforestation and global warming.20
Occasionally, character evidence about an informant in a criminal case
will fall into this category.2' Where a defendant claims that the informant
coerced, entrapped, or framed him, for example, defense counsel might
attempt to introduce evidence that the informant had done likewise to
other individuals.22 This situation arises rarely, however. Usually, a
defense attorney attacks the credibility of the informant-witness, which
brings into play the second set of rules, to which this Article now turns.
B. Character of a Witness
Two rules govern the use of "character evidence" to attack or defend
the character of a witness:23 Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609.
1. Rule 609
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 permits a litigant to impeach a witness's
character for truthfulness by cross-examining the witness about certain
prior convictions. The rule provides, in pertinent part:
LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 5, § 150. Federal Rule of Evidence 412(b) codifies
exceptions to the ban on a sex-offense complainant's prior sexual behavior. See
generally FED. R. EviD. 412(b); FISHMAN, supra note 9, ch 19.
20 See, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 9; EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, UNCHARGED
MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (1984). Each of these sources is an entire volume dedicated
to the subject, demonstrating, if nothing else, what some law professors do instead of
having a life. The law review articles devoted to the subject are so numerous that their
footnotes probably surpass the daytime population of New York City on a workday.
23 United States v. Sonntag, 684 F.2d 781, 788-89 (1 th Cir. 1982).
2 United States v. Lochmondy, 890 F.2d 817, 821-22 (6th Cir. 1989); Washington
v. Negrete, 863 P.2d 137, 140 (Wash. App. Div. 1993). For a discussion of defense
use of character evidence in such situations, see FISHMAN, supra note 9, § 17:78.
" Needless to say, participants in the events giving rise to a lawsuit often also appear
as witnesses at trial. FISHMAN, supra note 9, § 14:2; 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 2, § 404.02[2]. Thus, the admissibilityof"character evidence" about such a witness
requires applying the rules summarized in the previous section of this Article as well
as Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609. The former rules focus on evidence that is
arguably relevant about the underlying events in the case itself, while the latter rules
focus exclusively on the character of the witness for truthfulness.
2002]
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Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of
a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which
the witness was convicted...; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.24
Thus, an attorney has not only an absolute right to impeach a witness who
has been convicted of a Rule 609(a)(2) crime-a crime "involv[ing]
dishonesty or false statement"-whether it was a felony or a misdemeanor,
but also a presumptive right to impeach a witness with a Rule 609(a)(1)
crime-a felony conviction that did not involve "dishonesty or false
statement."25 With regard to Rule 609(a)(1) felonies, the judge has
discretion to preclude or limit the impeachment, although this discretion
is not likely to come into play very often when the witness is a govern-
ment informant who was heavily involved in the case.26
24 FED. R. EvID. 609(a). The rule establishes a somewhat different balance of
probative value and risk of unfair prejudice if the witness being impeached is "an
accused," i.e., the defendant in a criminal case. FED. R. EvID. 609(a). To balance the
probative value and risk of unfair prejudice, a past conviction may not be introduced
if: (1) more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction sought to be
entered into evidence; (2) the conviction was subject to pardon, annulment, certificates
of rehabilitation, or any other finding of rehabilitation of that person; or (3) the
conviction was part of a juvenile adjudication. FED. R. EVID. 609(b)-(d). However, if
an appeal from a conviction is pending, that will not prevent it from being admissible
in court. FED. R. EvID. 609(e).
25 A felony is "[a] serious crime usually punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year or by death." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 501 (7th ed. 2000).
26 Rule 609(a)(1) explicitly incorporates Rule 403, which authorizes the judge to
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, unnecessary consumption of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. See generally 2 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE §§
11:10-11:19 (7th ed. 1994) (discussing Rule 403). See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 2, § 608.02[3][b], at 11 (discussing the court's discretion in controlling
impeachment). Federal Rule of Evidence 611 gives the judge the flexibility to accept
evidence that will not jeopardize the dignity of the witness. WEISSENBERGER, supra
note 2, § 611.1. The credibility of a government informant who has played a key role
in a criminal case is so important an issue, however, that a judge's discretion to limit





Federal Rule of Evidence 608 provides:
Rule 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only
to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness
has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of
a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved
by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court,
if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being
cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness,
does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only
to credibility.27
This Article explores this provision and its various sub-parts in the order
in which they are likely to occur at a trial.
a. Cross-Examining the Witness: Rule 608(b)(1)
Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b)(1) governs how an attorney may
attack a witness's character for credibility on cross-examination.2" Pro-
viding she has a good-faith basis,29 an impeaching attorney may question
27 FED. R. EvuD. 608.
2 The rule does not restrict cross-examination of extrinsic evidence that focuses on
the accuracy of the witness's perception or memory of the events in question, the
witness's narrative skills, or evidence suggesting that the witness is consciously or
subconsciously biased. McCORMIcK, supra note 2, §§ 44-45; WEiNSTEiN & BERGER,
supra note 2, § 608.20[3][a-[b]. The rule regulates only the use of information about
prior specific acts to impeach the witness's character. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
29 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480, 69 S. Ct. 213,220, 93 L. Ed.
168, 176 (1948); United States v. Adair, 951 F.2d 316, 319 (11th Cir. 1992). The
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the witness about unsavory acts in the witness's past not directly relevant
to the events in question in the lawsuit, but only if those unsavory acts
are "probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness," such as lying, forgery,
deception, or fraud.30 Thus, an attorney cannot attack W I's character for
truthfulness by asking him about a failure to pay child support, driving
without a license, being fired for excessive absences, or the like.31 Such
behavior might not make WI a desirable neighbor, employee, or son-in-
law, but because the behavior does not directly involve acts of lying or
deception, the rule does not permit cross-examination on such subjects.
Assume defendant (D) is on trial for participating in a fraud. WI,
another participant, plead guilty and is testifying for the government as
part of his plea bargain. D's attorney has learned that W1 falsified his
expense vouchers on an unrelated business trip a few years ago. This
conduct qualifies as an untruthful act and is therefore within the scope
of Rule 608(b).33 As a result, defense counsel may, "in the discretion of
the court," ask Wl: "Isn't it a fact that you falsified your expense voucher
on a business trip you took in 1999?"
34
impeaching attorney does not have to show that the witness was convicted in connection
with a Rule 608(b) bad act, nor that he was arrested, indicted, fired, or sued in
connection with it. It is only necessary for the impeaching attorney to show that the
attorney has a good-faith basis to believe that the witness committed the act. Michelson,
335 U.S. at 480; Adair, 951 F.2d at 319; FISHMAN, supra note 9, § 16.37; MCCORMICK,
supra note 2, § 41.
30 United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2001) (permitting testimony
regarding altering time cards and other documents that were not the subject of the
litigation); United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 256-57 (3d Cir. 1999); United States
v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 1117, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 2, §§ 608.10, 608.22[2][a]-[b] (discussing some particular acts that are probative
of truthfulness). But see United States v. Miles, 207 F.3d 988, 994 (7th Cir. 2000)
(stating that the failure to register a gun was a mistake and not deceit). The court must
determine whether the evidence regarding an individual's unsavory acts is probative
of truthfulness. United States v. Hurst, 951 F.2d 1490, 1501 (6th Cir. 1991).
3' WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.22[2].
32 FED. R. EViD. 608(a), advisory committee's note ("In accordance with the bulk
ofjudicial authority, the inquiry is strictly limited to character for veracity, rather than
allowing evidence as to character generally. The result is to sharpen relevancy, to reduce
surprise, waste of time, and confusion, and to make the lot of the witness somewhat less
unattractive." (citation omitted)).
3 See, e.g., Simonelli, 237 F.3d at 23.
34 FISHMAN, supra note 9, §§ 16.38, 16.40.
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WI shakes his head angrily: "No, I did not!" May D's attorney later
call W2, who was Wl's supervisor, to testify that WI in fact did submit
false expense vouchers? Rule 608(b) says "no," because although specific
acts of untruthfulness may be inquired into on cross-examination, they
"may not be proved by extrinsic evidence."
35
b. Rule 608(a)(1)
Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a)(1) permits an impeaching attorney
to call a second witness to give negative reputation or opinion testimony
about a prior witness in the case. 6 Thus, in the example above, D's
attorney could call W2, who, once the proper foundation is shown, may
Courts have taken three basic approaches to determining whether certain conduct
is relevant to the witness's character for truthfulness. Under a broad view, virtually
any conduct indicating bad character relates to untruthfulness. Under the narrow
view, conduct is admissible only if it directly involves falsehood or deception, such
as forgery or perjury. Under the middle view, "behavior seeking personal advantage
by taking from others in violation of their rights" may be admissible if committed
under circumstances reflecting on veracity.
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.22[2][c][i], at 57 (quoting United States v.
Manske, 186 F.3d 770, 774-75 (7th Cir. 1999)).
15 FED. R. EvID. 608(b); see also LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 5, § 306;
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.22[1], at 46.
36 FED. R. EviD. 608(a)(1); see also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 471
n.2, 69 S. Ct. 213, 216 n.2, 93 L. Ed. 732, 735 n.2 (1948); FISHMAN, supra note 9, §
16.46.
17 Before W2 could so testify, D's attorney would have to "lay a foundation"
establishing that W2 knows WI well enough to have a factual basis for her opinion.
Or W2 could show that she has spoken to other members in a "community" in which
W1 lives and functions, thereby establishing that she is qualified to report what that
community's assessment ofWl 's character is. Concerning the foundational requirement,
see FISHMAN, supra note 9, §§ 16:20-16:26. See also United States v. Ruiz-Castro, 92
F.3d 1519, 1529-30 (1Oth Cir. 1996); WEINSTEIN &BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.14[2].
To establish the necessary foundation,
the witness must be able to demonstrate that he or she is sufficiently acquainted with
(1) the person whose character is under attack, (2) the community in which that
person has lived, and (3) the circles in which that person has moved, so that the
witness can speak with authority of the manner in which that person generally is
regarded.
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.14[2], at 30.
2002]
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
testify that W I's reputation for truthfulness among fellow employees was
poor, and that in her opinion, WI is someone who cannot be relied upon
to tell the truth.38 W2 cannot substantiate her testimony with information
about specific instances in which WI was untruthful, because the latter
would constitute extrinsic proof of a specific instance, which is explicitly
forbidden by the first sentence of Rule 608(b)(1).39
c. Rule 608(a)(2)
Finally, Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a)(2) directs that a party may
rehabilitate a witness's character for truthfulness by calling another
witness (W3, in our scenario) to testify favorably about previous witness
(Wl)'s good character for truthfulness, but only if "the character of the
witness [WI] for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation
evidence or otherwise."4 The advisory committee's note to this provision
is instructive as to the meaning of "otherwise":
Character evidence in support of credibility is admissible under the rule only
after the witness' character has first been attacked, as has been the case at
common law. The enormous needless consumption of time which a contrary
practice would entail justifies the limitation. Opinion or reputation that the
witness is untruthful specifically qualifies as an attack under the rule, and
evidence of misconduct, including conviction of crime, and of corruption
also fall within this category. Evidence ofbias or interest does not. Whether
evidence in the form of contradiction is an attack upon the character of the
witness must depend upon the circumstances.4'
Thus, by cross-examining Wl about the expense voucher or by calling
W2 to give negative reputation or opinion testimony about D's character
for truthfulness, D's attorney has opened the door.42 The prosecutor can
38 FED. R. EvED. 608(a)(1).
9 FISHMAN, supra note 9, § 16.42; LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 5, § 308;
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.20[1].
40 FED. R. EvID. 608(a)(2) (emphasis added).
4 FED. R. EvID. 608(a), advisory committee's note (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
42 FISHMAN, supra note 9, § 16.4; see also United States v. Brown, 39 F.3d 1188
(9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table opinion) (stating that the facts present the classic
example of opening the door on cross-examination).
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now call W3, who, if the proper foundation is laid,4" can testify that in
his opinion W1 is a truthful person and that WI enjoys a good reputation
for truthfulness in a particular community."
3. Summary
After an informant has testified for the government on direct examina-
tion, Federal Rules of Evidence 608(b) and 609(a) govern how the
defense attorney may question the informant about unsavory acts in his
past. Although the rules differ in many particulars-the kinds ofprior acts
about which the informant maybe questioned,4" whether defense counsel
can offer evidence to back up the question if the witness answers "no,'46
43 See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 5, § 308.
44 FISHMAN, supra note 9, §§ 16.20-26, 16:27; LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note
5, § 308; WEINSTEIN &BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.12[4][b] (noting that a witness may
present a supportive character witness if his credibility has been attacked).
4S Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2) permits questioning about a conviction for
any crime "involv[ing] dishones[ty] or false statement." FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(2). Rule
609(a)(1) permits questioning about any felony conviction, whether or not the
impeaching crime involved dishonesty or false statement. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). Rule
608(b) permits questioning about conduct, which has not resulted in a conviction, only
if that conduct is "probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness." FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
Thus, an informant could not be cross-examined about prior assaults or drug or alcohol
offenses, unrelated to the facts in the current case, which did not result in a felony
conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3 d 19, 23 (1 st Cir. 2001); United
States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231,256-57 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d
1117, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000). Butsee United States v. Miles, 207 F.3d 988,994 (7th Cir.
2000) (stating that a failure to register a gun is not probative of untruthfulness because
it was a mistake and not deceit).
' If a witness falsely denies a Rule 609 conviction, the impeaching attorney may
offer extrinsic evidence of the conviction. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 42; WEINSTEIN
&BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.20[ 1], at 32 ("Specific instances of a witness's conduct,
other than a conviction of a crime, that are offered to attack or support a witness's
credibility may not be proved by extrinsic evidence." (footnote omitted)). But counsel
may not offer extrinsic evidence to prove an instance in which a witness engaged in
conduct (unrelated to the current case) "probative of ... untruthfulness," even if, when
asked about it on cross-examination, the witness (let us assume falsely) denies having
engaged in that conduct. Id. § 608.22[1]. Butsee id. § 609.04[2][a] (stating that "[a]
conviction that does not involve dishonesty or false statement, such as assault, may be
admitted only after the court has performed the appropriate balancing test").
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and even how the questions may be worded47-they have this in common:
each permits counsel to ask about such acts to attack the informant's
credibility as a person.4"
II. Impeaching and Rehabilitating
the Informant
A. Types of Impeachment; Permissible Responses
We turn now to the question at hand: Do a defendant's attempts to
impeach a government informant, W1, open the door to prosecution
4$ Because Rule 608(b) bans the use of "extrinsic evidence" directly, logic suggests
that an impeaching attorney should also be precluded from using extrinsic words in
questioning the witness about prior untruthful acts. Thus, although (assuming a good-
faith basis for the question) the impeaching attorney may ask, "Didn't you falsify an
expense voucher in May, 2000?", she should not be permitted to ask, "Weren't you
arrested for (or charged with, suspended for, fired by your employer for) falsifying an
expense voucher?" Words like "arrested," "charged," "suspended," "fired," "accused,"
and "sued" are inherently extrinsic because they inform the jury that a third person has
alleged that the witness committed the act. See United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231,
257 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Impeaching the Witness: Prior
Bad Acts and Extrinsic Evidence, 7 CRIM. JUST., Winter, 1993, at 28, 31.
Rule 609 permits the impeaching attorney to use the word "convicted" while
questioning the witness-it would be impossible to bring out a prior conviction without
doing so-even though the word "convicted" is extrinsic, because it informs the jury that
someone else-the judge or jury in the prior case-came to the conclusion that the witness
committed the impeaching crime. Rule 609 thus stands as an exception to the Rule
608(b) ban on use of extrinsic evidence (or extrinsically worded questions) to impeach
a witness's character.
"$ Because an informant's credibility will almost always be an important issue for
the jury, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a judge could properly preclude
a defense attorney from using an informant's prior conviction to impeach the informant.
Where the informant's list of Rule 609 convictions is particularly long, the judge might
reasonably instruct defense counsel to choose four or five to use and to leave the rest
alone. Similarly, although Rule 608(b)(1) explicitly gives the trial judge discretion to
permit impeaching cross-examination about prior untruthful acts, in a criminal case,
particularly where the witness is important to the government's case, the discretion to
say "no questioning" begins only after defense counsel has already examined the
informant extensively. See United States v. Manske, 186 F.3d 770, 777-80 (7th Cir.




evidence about W I's past reliability in other cases? Such evidence would
suggest to thejury that W I's testimony ought to be believed in the current
case. The case law is sparse, somewhat contradictory and inconclusive,
but suggests that the answer depends, at least in part, on how defense
counsel attacks the informant's credibility.49 Results depend on whether
the attack is a general assault on the informant's character for truthfulness,
a specific accusation that the informant lied to frame the defendant to gain
a specific advantage, or a general accusation that the informant lied to
give the authorities what they demanded of him. These distinctions are
often difficult to draw and are somewhat artificial; in a typical case a
defense attorney might reasonably employ all three. Each method is
discussed in turn below.
1. Rebutting an Attack on the Informant's Character for
Truthfulness
As we have seen, if D's attorney cross-examines Wi about prior
convictions or untruthful acts under Rules 609(a) and 608(b)(1), the
prosecutor, still during the government's case-in-chief, may rehabilitate,
under Rule 608(a)(2), by calling W2 to testify that in his opinion WI is
a truthful person. 0 First, however, W2 must give foundation testimony
establishing that he knows W 1 well enough to have a valid basis for that
opinion."' Where W2 is a police officer with whom WI has cooperated,
to establish the foundation for his opinion, W2 may testify in general
terms that WI has cooperated with the authorities (for however many
months or years) and that based on that cooperation, W2 believes WI to
be a truthful person.52 The courts that have considered the issue have held
" Compare United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310,321 (3d Cir. 1997) (permitting
evidence about the informant's past cooperation), with United States v. Cox, 91 F.3d
135 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (finding that testimony and argument
regarding an informant's prior cooperation was improper bolstering).
"0 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
sI See FED. R. EvID. 608(a)(1).
s As anyone in law enforcement who has worked with informants knows, W2 is
really saying, "In my opinion W 1 tells the truth when he believes that we are watching
him closely and is convinced that we will yank his chain hard if he tries to lie."
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consistently that such testimony is permissible.13 There is comparatively
little law, however, deciding whether W2 may testify as to specifics.
In a Third Circuit decision, United States v. Murray, the defendant was
convicted of murder and narcotics trafficking.54 Defense counsel cross-
examined the key witness on the murder charge, Richard Brown, about
his drug use, his drug and theft convictions, his unlawful carrying of an
unlicenced weapon, "his concealment of his drug use from [a] friend and
contact in the ... police department, and his prior inconsistent statements
to the grand jury."" Categorizing this as an attack on Brown's character
for truthfulness, 56 the Third Circuit correctly held that it was proper to
permit a police lieutenant to offer general rebuttal testimony about the
informant's cooperation to establish a foundation for the agent's favorable
opinion testimony about the informant's character for truthfulness. 57 The
court further held, again correctly, that the prosecutor went too far when
he had the lieutenant testify as to a specific number of cases, search
warrants, or seizures that resulted from Brown's cooperation, because
53 United States v. Smith, 344 U.S. App. D.C. 19,24-26,232 F.3d 236,241-43 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Murray, 103 F.3d at 321-22; United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 1561, 1564
(11 Ith Cir. 1986); see also Baxter v. Alabama, 723 So. 2d 810,818-20 (Ala. Crim. App.
1998) (permitting an informant to provide testimony regarding his character because
defense counsel had attacked the informant's character for truthfulness when the officer
testified); Moore v. Indiana, 471 N.E.2d 684, 689 (Ind. 1984) (stating that the officer's
testimony regarding the informant's past successes in acting as an informant would
"hardly bolster his character"); Engel v. N.J. Dep't of Corrections, 270 N.J. Super. 176,
179-80, 636 A.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (admitting testimony of
investigation authorities to bolster the informant's credibility but remanded because
defendant was not given the same opportunity to prove his testimony was reliable).
' 103 F.3d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1997).
5" Murray, 103 F.3d at 321.
6 d. Some of this cross-examination-relating to Brown's convictions, lying to his
friend, and perhaps the inconsistent statements to the grand jury-clearly qualifies as an
attack on Brown's character for truthfulness under the "or otherwise" clause of Rule
608(a). Other aspects, such as his untaxed compensation, would most often be
categorized as an attack suggesting motive to lie. See United States v. Simonelli, 237
F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2001). Questions about Brown's drug use and carrying an
unlicenced weapon technically would not be admissible for either purpose, but would
be relevant to show that the police officers with whom he was working either knowingly
tolerated his unlawful conduct or had very little control over him, which in either case
challenges the integrity of any case based on Brown's cooperation and testimony.
17 Murray, 103 F.3d at 321-22.
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such testimony constituted evidence of specific extrinsic acts forbidden
by Rules 608(a) and 608(b). 8
2. Rebutting Cross-Examination Attacking the Informant's
Motive for Testifying
a. A Specific Accusation
Another standard defense tactic is to elicit testimony from the
informant, or from the officers with whom the informant is cooperating,
spelling out the benefits the informant has received or hopes to receive
for his cooperation. 9 For example, the defense may elicit testimony
concerning a favorable plea bargain, a reduced sentence, cash awards
dependant upon the extent and success of his cooperation, and the like.60
The obvious thrust of such impeachment is to suggest that the informant
is lying to frame the defendant in order to gain the benefit(s) in question.
To rebut this attack, the government often attempts to introduce
evidence of previous instances of the defendant's cooperation which led
to seizures, arrests, indictments, guilty pleas, and convictions.6 If offered
to support the theorem, "the informant has been truthful in other cases,
so he was probably truthful in this case as well," it should be excluded
as inadmissible character evidence because, in the terms of Rule 608(b),
it constitutes "extrinsic evidence" of"[s]pecific instances ofthe [truthful]
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of ... supporting the witness'
credibility."62
" Id.; see also United States v. Taylor, 900 F.2d 779, 781 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
"that it was error for the court to admit extrinsic evidence that the informer... had
provided reliable information and testimony that resulted in several convictions"). The
Taylor court did not provide a specific description of the evidence offered. See id.
59 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 232 F.3d 236, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
60See, e.g., United States v. Green, 258 F.3d 683, 692 (7th Cir. 2001); Smith, 232
F.3d at 241.
61 See, e.g., United States v. Fusco, 748 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding the
DEA agent's testimony concerning the informant's prior specific acts was admissible
for the purpose of establishing an absence of bias).
62 FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Such evidence would also fall under the ban of the first
sentence of Rule 404(b). See FISHMAN, supra note 9, § 17:4.
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Rule 608(b) excludes such evidence only if offered for the forbidden
"purpose of... supporting the witness' credibility."63 Accordingly, an
experienced prosecutor will instead argue that she is offering the evidence
to rebut defense counsel's accusation ofbias or motive to lie. Should this
argument suffice to overcome defendant's objection of improper
bolstering?
Where defense counsel suggests that the informant's deal with the
government is contingent specifically upon his ability to deliver up the
defendant, the Seventh Circuit has held, the Government should be
permitted to elicit testimony that the informant has cooperated in other
cases as well.' In United States v. Lindemann, the defendant, a promi-
nent member of the thoroughbred racing set, was accused of hiring Tom
Burns to kill an expensive, unsuccessful-but highly insured-race horse.65
On cross-examination, counsel suggested that Bums needed to land a "big
fish" like the defendant to get his favorable plea bargain.' On redirect
the prosecutor elicited from Bums that he had named thirty others who
had hired him for similar purposes, and that ninety percent of them had
plead guilty.67 The Seventh Circuit held that, because the evidence was
relevant to rebut an accusation of bias and motive to lie, its admissibility
was not affected by Rule 608(b)'s prohibition against specific act
evidence to bolster a witness's credibility, and it was not an abuse of
discretion to admit it.68
It is entirely appropriate to admit general evidence of other instances
of cooperation in this situation. To rule otherwise would permit defense
counsel to mislead the jury while giving the prosecution no way to set
the record straight. Whether the government should be allowed to elicit
63 FED. R. EviD. 608(b); see WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.20[1].
"United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1243 (7th Cir. 1996).
6- 85 F.3d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1996).
6 Lindemann, 85 F.3d at 1242.
617 Id. The trial court immediately instructed that the latter testimony should be
considered "solely for the purpose of understanding the scope of Tom Bums'
cooperation with the government," and the fact that others pleaded guilty "must not be
considered by you to infer" the guilt of the defendant on trial. Id.
68 Id. at 1243-44.
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testimony about a specific number of other cases, let alone convictions
or guilty pleas, is another matter and is discussed below.
b. A General Accusation
Where the defense attack is more general, emphasizing that his
arrangement with the authorities gives the informant a motive to lie
without suggesting that the case against the defendant is the keystone to
the deal, it is not so clear what the law is, or should be. The Eleventh
Circuit has held that such evidence should be admitted over an objection
of improper bolstering.69 The Fifth Circuit has held that such bolstering
is permissible before the defendant has an opportunity to impeach the
informant.7" Other courts have held the admission of such evidence is
not "plain" or "reversible" error where defense counsel failed to assert
improper bolstering under Rule 608(b) as the basis for an objection. 1
SSeeUnited States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 1561, 1564 (1 lth Cir. 1986). The defendant
inSanchez "cross-examined a DEA agent about [the informant's] suitability for federal
investigative work." Id. The opinion, however, does not provide details. See id. On
redirect, "the agent testified that other DEA agents had worked with [the informant] in
prior investigations and found him reliable." Id. In ruling that admitting this evidence
was not error, the court noted that "the purpose of this testimony was not to bolster [the
informant's] credibility, but to justify the DEA's decision to employ him." Id.
70 United States v. Fusco, 748 F.2d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Evidence of past
behavior that proves or disproves bias is therefore admissible notwithstanding Rule
608(b)."). In Fusco, the trial judge permitted a government agent to discuss the extent
of the informant's cooperation (including quantities of drugs seized and number of
defendants indicted) before defense counsel even had an opportunity to attack the
informant. Id. at 997. The Fifth Circuit held that this was not improper bolstering, but
a rebuttal of an anticipated attack against the informant's purported bias, and that
although it is not advisable to permit a prosecutor to defend against such an attack before
the attack has been made, the trial court had not abused its discretion in permitting it
in this case. Id. at 998-99.
"' A summary of several of those cases follows. In United States v. Smith, defense
counsel cross-examined a federal agent about the informant's plea agreement and receipt
of money for his cooperation, 232 F.3d 236, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2000). On redirect, when
the prosecutor began to elicit information about the informant's cooperation in other
cases, defense counsel objected to the "relevance" of the information; the judge
overruled the objection. Id. at 240. The D.C. Circuit held, quite correctly, that the
testimony was relevant. Id.; see also United States v. Sumlin, 271 F.3d 274, 282 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (If evidence is "offered only to bolster an informant's credibility, the extrinsic
evidence is barred by Rule 608(b). If offered for an alternative and legitimate reason
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B. Evaluation
As noted earlier, at least one federal circuit appears to have held that
cross-examination suggesting a motive to lie automatically opens the door
(over a proper objection of improper bolstering) to rebuttal evidence
including specific details about cooperation in other cases (number of
cases, seizures, arrests, guilty pleas, convictien'). 72 This holding
substantially undercuts the rule against bolstering. Worse, it contributes
little to the truth-finding process because opening the door to cooperation
'... the evidence falls outside Rule 608(b)'s narrow confines."' (citation omitted)). It
is noteworthy that, in Smith, the trial judge sustained defense counsel's general objection
when the prosecutor asked the agent whether any of the other arrests based on the
informant's cooperation were "corroborated by any tangible evidence," and sustained
another general objection when the prosecutor asked the agent whether he believed the
informant's information in the current case was truthful. Smith, 232 F.3d at 240-4 1.
In United States v. Lochmondy, after defense counsel accused the informant of lying
for his own benefit, the prosecutor on redirect brought out that the informant had also
cooperated against others, who subsequently pleaded guilty. 890 F.2d 817, 821 (6th
Cir. 1989). Defense counsel did not object until the next day during final arguments.
Id. When the prosecutor mentioned in summation that others had been convicted, the
trial judge sustained defense counsel's objection and instructed the jury not to consider
the informants' cooperation in other cases in assessing the defendants' guilt or innocence.
Id. The court held that, if it was error to admit the testimony, it was not "reversible"
error. Id. at 822.
In United States v. Green, defense counsel's cross-examination of a government
witness accused the informant of "setting up" a number of people, including the
defendant, on false drug charges in order to avoid prosecution for his own crimes. 258
F.3d 683, 692 (7th Cir. 2001). An agent, however, who had previously worked with
the informant, testified that the informant's information in other cases was "credible and
reliable and consistent with" what other officers had observed. Id. at 693. Because
defendant's counsel did not object to this testimony, the Seventh Circuit held that its
review was for plain error. Id. at 692-93. The court found that there was not plain error,
and the general tenor of the court's discussion suggests that it would have found no abuse
of discretion had the trial court admitted it over a timely objection. Id. at 693. Counsel
did object to testimony that the informant's cooperation in one case led to a conviction,
and the government conceded on appeal that admitting this testimony was error. Id.
Without deciding the issue, the Seventh Circuit held that, even if it was an error to admit
the testimony, it was harmless. Id.
In United States v. Martinez, when evidence that others against whom the informant
had given information had pleaded guilty, the defense counsel failed to object on hearsay
grounds. 775 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit, however, held that the
evidence was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the others' guilt, but to
demonstrate the informant's credibility. Id. at 37.
72 Fusco, 748 F.2d at 998.
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evidence could require increased discovery of sensitive information, mid-
trial delays, and introduction of collateral evidence at trial." In addition,
evidence that an informant has been honest and truthful in some cases
does not negate the argument that he has a motive to lie in the present
case and is therefore of less than compelling probative value.
Allowing a witness to testify to specific cooperation evidence could
prolong and complicate a trial. As a matter of fairness, defense counsel
should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge such evidence.
Where the informant or officer testifies about a specific number of cases
in which the informant cooperated, the defense is arguably entitled to
access to the list of all such cases.74 As a result, defense counsel may
request a mid-trial recess to examine the records and to interview the
principals involved. Moreover, defense counsel should be afforded an
opportunity to call witnesses from those cases to rebut the claim either
that the informant's cooperation played an important role or that the
targets in those cases were in fact guilty of the crimes charged. Allowing
this evidence, therefore, opens the door to mini-trials on collateral
matters, which is precisely the evil that the rule against extrinsic act
evidence on witness truthfulness was intended to avert."
Conclusion
The solution to the dilemma (get ready for a brilliant insight) rests,
first, in the obligation of defense counsel to raise a specific objection
("improper bolstering in violation of Rule 608(b)"), and second, in the
sound discretion of the trial judge.76
The following specifics are suggested.
First, when defense counsel attacks the informant's credibility
(whether as a general attack on his character or as an implied accusation
7See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.20[1], at 33 (stating that "extrinsic
evidence is inadmissible to prove collateral matters").
4 Where the cases on the list are finalized and the informant's role in them is already
known to those who were targeted in them, turning over the list might not be too painful
to the police department or prosecutor's office. In other circumstances, though, doing
so could seriously jeopardize other cases, or even people's lives.
"See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 608.20[1].
7 I said the insight would be brilliant. I did not say it would be original.
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of motive to lie, or both), the judge should permit the prosecutor to have
a police officer testify that the informant has been cooperating with the
authorities for however-many weeks, months, or years, that in the
officer's opinion the informant is truthful, and that the informant's
reputation for truthfulness among other officers with whom she has
worked is good. This testimony is clearly permitted by Rule 608(a)(2).
Second, where the Government's "bolstering" evidence about the
informant is restricted to favorable opinion or reputation testimony,
defense counsel should be given the option of cross-examining such
testimony by asking for some details (for example, the number of cases,
arrests, seizures, convictions). This is a tactic of questionable wisdom
in most cases, but as a general rule defense counsel should not be
permitted to demand names or other specifics.
Third, assuming the government's "bolstering" evidence is restricted
to favorable opinion or reputation testimony about the informant, defense
counsel should be permitted to request thejudge to require the prosecutor
or police officer to make an exparte showing to thejudge that the inform-
ant has in fact provided useful, and truthful, information in the past. This
showing need not be elaborate-in the typical case it should suffice for the
government to provide a list of cases or seizures made with the infor-
mant's help.
Finally, as a rule the judge should not permit the prosecutor to elicit
testimony from the informant or a police officer as to the number of cases,
seizures, arrests, indictments, guilty pleas, or convictions obtained as a
result of the informant's cooperation. Testimony about specific other
cases should not be permitted, unless such evidence is relevant on facts
directly at issue in the trial.
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